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The transformation of agriculture in Ukraine: 
From collective farms to agroholdings
Arkadiusz Sarna
In recent years, Ukraine’s agriculture has been consistently improving and has been the only 
part of the country’s economy to buck the recession. According to preliminary estimates, 
in 2013 agricultural production increased by 13.7% - in contrast to a 4.7% decline in the in-
dustrial sector. According to official statistics, Ukraine’s industrial production was up 40% 
in the final months of 2013 when compared to the same period of 2012. This translated into 
an unexpected gain in fourth-quarter GDP growth (+3.7%) and prevented an annual drop in 
GDP. Crop production, and particularly the production of grain, hit a record high: in 2013, 
Ukraine produced 63 million tonnes of grain, outperforming its best ever harvest of 2011 
(56.7 million tonnes). The value of Ukraine’s agricultural and food exports increased from 
US$4.3 billion in 2005 to US$17.9 billion in 2012, and currently accounts for a quarter of Ukra-
ine’s total exports. Economic forecasts suggest that in the current marketing year (July 2013 
- June 2014) Ukraine will sell more than 30 million tonnes of grain to foreign markets, making 
it the world’s second biggest grain exporter, after the United States.
Ukraine’s government hopes that the growing 
agricultural production and booming exports 
will help the country overcome the recession 
which has been ongoing since mid-2012, and 
that the sector will become a driving force for 
sustained economic growth. However, the suc-
cess of this plan is contingent on several fac-
tors: primarily, on the economic situation in 
Ukraine’s export markets, a better investment 
climate inside the country, as well as on future 
government policy, including the completion 
of an agrarian reform launched over 20 years 
ago. Despite pressing ahead with land owner-
ship reform, the government has so far been 
reluctant to permit the free purchase and sale 
of agricultural land. Consequently, the growth 
of the agricultural sector has led to a concen-
tration of production within very large agricul-
tural holdings, known locally as agroholdings, 
characterised by large-scale intensive farming. 
The top one hundred holdings already control 
over 30% of all the land (6.7 million hectares) 
farmed by all agricultural companies operating 
in Ukraine (about 50,000 of them), correspond-
ing to more than 16% of the total agricultural 
land in the country. This agricultural model has 
led to growing socio-economic disparities in 
Ukraine’s crisis-stricken countryside.
The significance of agriculture 
to Ukraine’s economy
Agriculture accounts for about 8% of Ukraine’s 
gross domestic product - a rate several times 
higher than among Europe’s major agricultur-
al producers1. Its significance to the economy 
1 And twice as high as in Russia or Poland, see: http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS
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stems mainly from crop production, which ac-
counted for nearly 67% of all domestic agricul-
tural production in 2012. Despite showing signs 
of recovery from a severe crisis in the 1990s, 
animal production in Ukraine remains tied to 
small farms and is used largely for the personal 
consumption of the producers.
Ukraine has  the second largest acreage of 
farmland in Europe (after Russia) with a total 
of 41.5 million hectares of agricultural land 
(about 70% of the total area of the country), of 
which arable land accounts for over 32 million 
hectares. Ukraine benefits from a favourable 
climate and good quality soils, of which about 
half are the highly fertile chernozem (or black 
earth). Ukraine is one of Europe’s leading grain 
producers: it is the continent’s largest producer 
and exporter of corn, the second largest pro-
ducer of sunflower seeds and sunflower oil (and 
the world’s largest exporter), as well as being 
a leading producer and exporter of wheat and 
barley (see Appendix 1).
Between 2005-2012, the export of food and 
agricultural products2 increased by 315% (in 
2013, Ukraine’s agricultural exports were worth 
an estimated US$17-18 billion). This makes ag-
riculture Ukraine’s second most important ex-
port sector, after the country’s traditional ex-
port leader – the steel industry3. In the previous 
marketing year (July 2012 - June 2013), Ukraine 
exported about 23 million tonnes of grain; in 
the 2013/2014 marketing year, which started in 
July, Ukraine is planning to export 30-32 million 
tonnes of grain, which would break the 1991 
record. In August of last year, the US Depart-
ment of Agriculture estimated that with grain 
exports of over 30 million tonnes, Ukraine may 
become the world’s second biggest grain ex-
porter in the current marketing year (second 
only to the United States).
2 Four product groups: (1) farm animals and animal prod-
ucts, (2) products of plant origin, (3) animal and vegeta-
ble fats and oils, (4) ready food products.
3 In 2012, Ukraine’s steel exports were worth US$18.9 bil-
lion and accounted for 27.5% of total exports.
This year’s record high production and exports 
of food and agricultural products have be-
come a driving force behind the “propaganda 
of success”, which the Kyiv government has 
actively engaged itself in to divert public opin-
ion from the exceptionally poor overall perfor-
mance of the Ukrainian economy. In fact, the 
record-breaking results are obscuring the grave 
problems that both this sector and the entire 
Ukrainian countryside have been facing for 
many years.
Post-1991 reforms: 
privatisation and land lease
After gaining independence, Ukraine entered 
a long-term agricultural crisis. The crisis was 
caused by the collapse of the centrally planned 
economy that had previously bankrolled a sys-
tem of large and expensive programmes across 
the Soviet Union, but more broadly, also by 
the failure of the sector to adapt to the new 
economic reality4. Agricultural reform proved 
exceptionally difficult due to the lack of ade-
quate market experience, insufficient capital in-
vestment, and the lack of a coherent vision for 
reform among the ruling elite.
One of the main objectives of the reform was 
to privatise Ukrainian land free of charge, un-
der the “socially-correct” slogan: “Land for 
those who work it”. This was seen as the pri-
4 Livestock production was particularly badly affected. 
Between 1991-2012, the population of horned cattle de-
creased by over 81% (from 24.6 million to 4.6 million), 
pigs - by 61% (from 19.4 million to 7.6 million), sheep - 
by 86% (from 7.9 million to 1.1 million), poultry - by 13% 
(from 246 million to 214 million).
The Ukrainian agriculture’s record- 
-breaking results are obscuring the grave 
problems that both this sector and the 
entire Ukranian countryside have been 
facing for many years.
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mary means to transform Ukraine’s rural areas 
and its agriculture. In the 1990s, Ukraine closed 
down nearly all 12,000 of its kolkhozes (collec-
tive farms) , whose assets were then placed un-
der collective ownership of the newly created 
non-state businesses.
The employees of the former collective farms 
(about 7 million people, or more than 40% of 
Ukraine’s rural population) - most of whom sub-
sequently found employment in the new, non-
state businesses – were given a land share, or 
a so-called pai, on the land previously man-
aged by the collective farms (an average of 
4 hectares). In addition, over 7 million rural res-
idents were granted ownership of small plots 
of land (up to 0.4 hectares) from the so called 
“Land Reserve Fund” and/or from the so-called 
“reserve land” (both owned by central or local 
government). The land was to be used for small-
scale domestic farming (in total, approximately 
2.6 million hectares). For many rural residents, 
this land has become their main source of in-
come. However, unlike in the case of household 
plots, the allocation of land shares (or pais) with-
in the reformed agricultural businesses (con-
firmed by official certificates) was not followed 
by an automatic right to physically claim the land 
- that is, the pais were not demarcated at spe-
cific locations and the farmers were not issued 
with title deeds to individual plots. Although this 
process began (with great difficulty) in the late 
1990s, it was not until May 2003 that parliament 
passed a special bill regulating the question of 
land titles. By the end of 2012, title deeds had 
been issued to 6.4 million people (about 93% of 
the eligible population5). As a result, in late 2012 
as much as 30.7 million hectares of agricultural 
land (or 74% of all agricultural land in Ukraine) 
was – nominally at least – in private ownership6.
Initially, it was envisaged that the land priva-
tisation process and agrarian reform would 
pave the way for the unrestricted purchase and 
sale of farmland in the country, but ongoing 
political disputes have led to the introduction 
of a series of temporary moratoriums on land 
sales, which are to remain in place until appro-
priate market conditions have been created in 
Ukraine. By “appropriate conditions” the policy 
makers meant the establishment of the neces-
sary legal and institutional infrastructure, and 
especially land market legislation being passed 
and a cadastre being created. The govern-
ment’s progress in this area, however, has been 
extremely slow.
The privatisation of farmland without the con-
comitant right to freely sell it, has contributed 
to the emergence of an agriculture based on 
land lease, which has been facilitated by the 
statutory authorisation to use pais as the sub-
ject of lease contracts. According to data from 
late 2012, half of all domestic agricultural land 
in Ukraine (49.8%) is under the management of 
about 50,000 businesses, operating mainly on 
leased land7.
Until 2010, the average annual cost of leasing 
1 hectare of agricultural land did not exceed 
the equivalent of US$40. More recently, howev-
er, lease fees have increased to around US$708 
- this was caused by the government’s decision 
5 http:// land.gov.ua/zemleustrii-ta-okhorona-zemel 
/103703-derchzemagentstvo-za-2012-rik-v-ukrayyni-vyda-
no-62-tys-derchavnyh-aktiv-vzamin-sertyfikativ.html
6 Of which 27.1 million hectares was arable land (83.5% of 
all arable land in the country).
7 38.1% of Ukraine’s agricultural land is managed by fam-
ily farms, 1.5% by other users, while 10.6% was made 
up of state owned so-called “reserve land” (not sold or 
granted for so-called “permanent use”). Source: www.
ukrstat.gov.ua
8 http://land.gov.ua/ru/component/news/?view=item&id 
=104013:tyzhnevyi-zvit-diialnosti-holovy-derzhavno-
ho-ahentstva-zemelnykh-resursiv-ukrainy-serhiia-tym-
chenka-1-4-kvitnia-2013-roku&catid=120:top-novyny
The privatisation of farmland without 
the concominant right to freely sell it, 
has contributed to the emergence of an 
agriculture based on the land lease.
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to raise the arbitrarily determined normative 
value of 1 hectare of farmland, and to increase 
the minimum land lease fee (to 3% of the 
land’s normative value). The low cost of land 
leasing (a fraction of the rates charged in the 
EU9), coupled with the possibility to use goods 
and services (often at inflated prices) in lease 
settlements, have facilitated the emergence of 
private and, most importantly, very large agri-
cultural companies.
From kolkhozniks to farmers...
A period of economic growth from 2000 to 
2008 (averaging about 7% of GDP per year) and 
low land lease rates and cheap labour (wages in 
agriculture are among the lowest in the econ-
omy) have improved the business conditions in 
the sector and the possibility of state support 
for Ukrainian agriculture. The most significant 
changes included: the introduction by parlia-
ment of the so-called “fixed agricultural tax”10 
in December 1998, VAT rebates, and state sub-
sidies for agricultural production, which mainly 
benefitted the largest players11. The develop-
ment of large-scale farms, however, was most 
directly facilitated by the increasingly appealing 
export opportunities. Since 2005, global mar-
kets have seen a systematic increase in the price 
of food and agricultural products (see Appen-
dix 2); this has translated into higher prices for 
the main grains produced in Ukraine: wheat, 
barley and corn. Even after taking into account 
the interim (although admittedly, painful) price 
falls (2008-2009 crisis), by 2013 the price of the 
three main grains mentioned earlier had in-
9 Aгрохолдинги в україні: добре чи погано?, Німецько-
Український Аграрний Діалог, Iнститут економiчних 
дослiджень та полiтичних консультацiй, Київ, серпень 
2008, http://www.ier.com.ua/ua/publications/consultancy 
work/?pid=1497 
10 The fixed agricultural tax affected those companies 
whose sales of agricultural products accounted for at 
least 75% of the total value of sales. The tax effectively 
reduced the fiscal burden on the companies, and several 
other taxes, including Corporate Income Tax.
11 Aгрохолдинги в україні: добре чи погано?..., p. 7.
creased significantly: two-fold for wheat, two 
and a half times for barley, and three-fold for 
corn. Importantly, the global increase in grain 
prices was accompanied by growing demand 
generated mostly by developing countries12.
Between 1996-2000, Ukraine’s total wheat ex-
ports reached 9.3 million tonnes - since 1991, 
wheat has been the main grain produced in the 
country. Over the next five years, this figure more 
than doubled (to 21.3 million tonnes) and be-
tween 2006-2010, Ukraine’s wheat exports rose 
by another 50%, to almost 33 million tonnes13.
Initially, wheat exports from Ukraine were dom-
inated by large global players, such as Toepfer, 
Cargill, and Serna. Thanks to the cooperation 
developed between international players and 
the local intermediaries in the supply chain, 
Ukraine saw the emergence of local players who 
gradually invested their profits in production, 
and began to export their produce themselves. 
Many of Ukraine’s largest agricultural compa-
nies started out as small-scale private farms, 
established back in the 1990s by the managers 
of former collective farms. They then quickly in-
creased their size, especially in the last 5-8 years, 
mainly on the basis of leased agricultural land.
The development of private farms - which con-
stitute the majority of all agricultural businesses 
established after 1991 (around 80%) and which 
12 L. Shavalyuk, “The Ukrainian Myth – the Breadbasket 
of the World”, The Ukrainian Week, 9 Sept 2013, http://
ukrainianweek.com/Economics/88895  
13 I. Kobuta, O. Sikachyna, V. Zhygadlo, Wheat Export 
Economy in Ukraine, FAO Regional Office for Europe 
and Central Asia. Policy Studies on Rural Transition No. 
2012-4, July 2012, p. 6.: http://www.fao.org/ fileadmin/
user_upload/Europe/documents/Publications/Policy_St-
dies/Ukrain_wheet_2012_en.pdf
The developement of private farms - which 
constitute the majority of all agriculrural 
business established after 1991 (around 
80%) begun to slow down in the middle 
of the past decade.
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operate an average area of  about 100 hectares 
- began to slow down in the middle of the past 
decade. The number of such farms fell from 
42,400 in 2005 to 40,700 in 2012. However, also 
this category of agricultural business shifted to-
wards large-scale farming: at present 16.2% of 
the largest private farms manage 80% of all the 
land cultivated by this type of agricultural busi-
ness (a total of about 4.4 million hectares).
...from farmers to large-scale 
land-managers 
The process of consolidating agricultural com-
panies through the merger and acquisition 
of smaller players (together with their land 
banks) has accelerated over the past few years. 
This consolidation allowed for the creation of 
a number of so-called “agroholdings”, which 
often operate in several parts of the country. 
The largest of them, UkrLandFarming, operates 
across an area of 670,000 hectares, making it 
the world’s eighth biggest agricultural holding 
(by land size)14. In terms of size, UkrLandFarm-
ing remains unmatched even by the largest ag-
ricultural companies in Russia - despite Russia’s 
unrestricted land market. UkrLandFarming is 
owned by 40-year-old Oleg Bakhmatyuk, who 
began his career in the late 1990s as a man-
ager in Itera - a Russian intermediary company 
supplying gas to Ukraine and other CIS coun-
tries (for a few months in 2006, Bakhmatyuk 
became one of the vice-presidents of the state 
14 “China looks to Ukraine as demand for food rises”, 
Financial Times, 5 Nov 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/a9c0db18-4554-11e3-b98b-00144feabdc0.ht-
ml#axzz2qgWmrumM 
monopoly NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine). In early 
January 2014, the US agribusiness giant Cargill 
announced that it had purchased a 5% stake in 
UkrLandFarming for US$200 million, which put 
the market value of the entire Ukrainian hold-
ing at US$4 billion. Bakhmatyuk plans to in-
crease the size of UkrLandFarming to 750,000-
800,000 hectares, and to make his company 
one of the world’s three largest agricultural 
giants within the next three years. This would 
raise UkrLandFarming’s total grain export ca-
pacity to 5-6 million tonnes15.
In recent years, Ukraine’s agriculture has become 
sufficiently lucrative to attract the attention of 
some of the country’s biggest oligarchs. They 
have begun to notice that agriculture could offer 
them greater profit-making opportunities than 
Ukraine’s heavy industry and metallurgy - the 
two pillars of their business operations, which 
are currently suffering from the effects of the 
recession. Among the well-known Ukrainian oli-
garchs who already own large agricultural hold-
ings are: Ihor Kolomoyskyi (120,000 hectares), 
Yuhym Zviahilsky - former acting Prime Minister 
of Ukraine, with close links to the current pres-
ident (62,000 hectares), and Petro Poroshenko 
(96,000 hectares). Viktor Pinchuk has also ex-
pressed an interest in investing in agriculture, 
while Dmytro Firtash established the holding DF 
Agro in 2001, and has so far invested his money 
in the production of vegetables. In 2011, Rinat 
Akhmetov, Ukraine’s wealthiest businessman 
and one of the sponsors of the ruling Party of 
Regions, together with his business partner 
Vadim Novinsky, created HarvEast Holding. The 
company was formed on the basis of the agri-
cultural assets of the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works 
(previously acquired by Akhmetov) and operates 
on nearly 200,000 hectares of land in Donetsk 
Oblast and in Crimea. Ukraine’s so-called “fam-
ily”, an interest group linked mainly to Oleksan-
dr Yanukovych, the son of the incumbent presi-
dent of Ukraine has also made a foray into the 
15 http://economics.lb.ua/business/2013/07/25/215362_
ukrainskiy_oligarh_hochet_troyku.html 
Ukrainian realities conducive to the de-
velopment of large agricultural compa-
nies, so-called agroholdings. The biggest 
of them already operate on hundreds 
of thousands of hectars of leased land.
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agricultural sector. According to some sources, 
the “family” will enter the market through the 
recently established State Food and Grain Cor-
poration of Ukraine, while they are expected to 
use the State Land Bank, established last year to 
help finance agricultural projects, as their deliv-
ery mechanism.
The vast majority of the local agricultural hold-
ings continue to be controlled by Ukrainian in-
vestors. Due to the lack of a free land market, 
and due to restrictions on the acquisition of 
agricultural land, foreign investors have fo-
cused mainly on agricultural processing and 
on the trade in Ukrainian grain. The profit po-
tential of Ukraine’s agricultural sector has also 
attracted passive foreign investors, who have 
been investing in shares in the Ukrainian agri-
cultural companies listed on foreign stock ex-
changes. Owners of “traditional” agricultural 
holdings (without links to the industrial and 
financial groups run by local oligarchs who 
can generate income from other sectors of 
the economy) have found the issuing of shares 
abroad to be a convenient way to raise capital 
for further expansion in the domestic market. 
This has been particularly important since cap-
ital-raising opportunities in the domestic mar-
ket are rather limited due to a poorly devel-
oped securities market in Ukraine and because 
of the high cost of borrowing. Obtaining busi-
ness loans from local banks would be easier 
if local farmland could be used as collateral 
- this, however, remains a pipe dream due to 
the delayed introduction of a free land market16. 
The ten largest Ukrainian agricultural holdings 
currently control more than 3.1 million hect-
ares of land, or more than 15% of Ukraine’s to-
tal farmland, which is cultivated by more than 
50,000 businesses operating in the sector (see 
Appendix 3).
The never-ending reform, or the progres-
sive collapse of the countryside
With growth as their primary objective, Ukraine’s 
agricultural holdings are often the only source 
of investment in rural areas. The investment is 
typically linked to production (human resources, 
technical infrastructure and logistics – grain han-
dling terminals, granaries, etc.), but sometimes 
also to the construction of social and other rural 
infrastructure. These are often businesses whose 
owners have family links to particular towns and 
villages. For example, the controversial gas and 
chemical tycoon Dmytro Firtash has used his ag-
ricultural holding DF Agro to invest in his home-
town of Synkiv, Ternopil Oblast, where he has 
constructed a large complex of greenhouses that 
will make the town one of the most cutting-edge 
vegetable producers in Europe. Meanwhile, Ivan 
Huta - a former chairman of a collective farm in 
his home village of Vasylkivtsi, Ternopil Oblast 
- has used his family farm to build one of the 
largest agricultural companies in Ukraine: Mriya 
Agro Holding (from 50 hectares of land in 1992 
to almost 300,000 hectares today). Although the 
company is now managed from Kyiv, Mriya Agro 
Holding has kept its headquarters in Vasylkivtsi. 
The company has financed the construction of 
local roads, and – just like DF Agro in Synkiv - it 
has built schools and preschools. By doing so, 
the agroholdings significantly lighten the bur-
den on the government in Ukraine’s rural areas, 
which have witnessed a dramatic decline in gov-
ernment funding since 1991.
16 Currently as many as seven Ukrainian agricultural com-
panies are listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, includ-
ing Ukraine’s leading “agro-holdings”, such as Kernel 
and Astarta Holding.
Rising incomes in agriculture are at-
tracting attention of oligarchs. Rinat 
Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyski, Dmytro 
Firtash formed their own agroholdings. 
The “family”, an interest group linked main-
ly to the son of incumbent president, also 
made a foray into the agricultural sector.
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Nonetheless, the activities of some of the ag-
ricultural holdings frequently boil down to the 
maximal use of resources within the term of the 
lease. This often leads to soil degradation and 
the devastation of local resources.
The rapid development of a new, narrow class 
of agricultural entrepreneurs, in times of the 
progressive impoverishment of the majority 
of Ukraine’s rural population, has exacerbated 
income inequalities and exposed what in ef-
fect is a re-feudalisation of social relations in 
the Ukrainian countryside. The rise of agribusi-
ness has often led to the disenfranchisement 
of large numbers of the nominal land owners 
and has resulted in them becoming almost en-
tirely dependent on the leaseholders. That is 
because the companies are often able to offer 
the impoverished pai owners not only a steady 
income but also the only possibility of local em-
ployment. Many residents - especially the el-
derly and the inexperienced, without sufficient 
financial resources or farming technology, un-
able to run a farm or uninterested in doing so 
- have been forced to lease their pais to agricul-
tural entrepreneurs or to the owners of private 
farms17. Some studies suggest that up to 80% 
of pai owners agree to lease out their land, and 
many of them (32.3%) have never physically 
seen their pai18.
The low prices of agricultural production19, cou-
pled with a crisis in all sectors of the economy 
after 1991, has markedly reduced the income 
of the rural population of Ukraine. Declining 
17 For example, of the 4.6 million pai lease contracts 
signed in 2011, as many as 2.4 million (52.6%) were en-
tered into by the owners of the pais - the rural pension-
ers. Source: A presentation by М. Кобець, Становлення 
ринку сільськогосподарських земель в Україні: 
зміни, тенденції та світовий досвід, Земельна Спілка 
України, Львів, 15 July 2011
18 See http://zsu.org.ua/index.php/publikatsii-smi/9357-ar-
endnye-otnosheniya-nuzhdayutsya-v-reformirovanii
19 For example, between 1991-2001, the cost of agricultural 
production in Ukraine increased 6-fold, compared to a 17-
20-fold increase in the price of industrial goods (the price 
of fertiliser, agricultural technologies and fuel has been ris-
ing rapidly) - see.: НАЦІОНАЛЬНА БЕЗПЕКА І ОБОРОНА 
№ 1, 2012 ЦЕНТР РАЗУМКОВА, pp. 27, www.razumkov.
org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD130_ukr.pdf
living standards and the rapid degradation 
of the countryside - for example, its technical 
and social infrastructure - has translated into 
a more pronounced demographic crisis than 
in urban areas. Between 1991-2013, the rural 
population of Ukraine decreased by as much as 
15.9% (2.7 million people), while the popula-
tion of urban areas declined by “only” 10.6% 
(3.7 million people). These figures represent the 
outcome of both negative population growth 
and large-scale migration to the cities, especial-
ly among young people looking for work. Over 
the past twenty years, more than 640 villages 
and hamlets have disappeared from the map of 
Ukraine20.
The prospects for Ukraine’s agriculture
It was a common belief that after Viktor Yanu-
kovych came to power in 2010, Ukraine would 
finally introduce a free land market and com-
plete its land reform. The changes seemed 
likely because of the monopolisation of pow-
er the Yanukovych camp had and because the 
agrarian reform (including the introduction of 
a free land market) was part of the presiden-
tial reform programme for 2010-201421. In ad-
dition, the parliament passed the cadastre bill 
20 This figure includes the 113 villages which have been 
merged with other villages or towns. At the beginning 
of 2013, there were 28,400 villages in Ukraine. Source: 
http://tyzhden.ua/News/77330
21 http://www.president.gov.ua/docs/Programa_reform_
FINAL_2.pdf 
The rapid development of a new, nar-
row class of agricultural entrepreneurs, 
in times of the progressive impoverish-
ment of the majority of Ukraine’s rural 
population, has exacerbated income in-
equalities and exposed what in effect is 
a re-feudalisation of social relations in the 
Ukrainian countryside.
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and agreed to debate the controversial law on 
a free land market22. On 12 November 2012, 
however, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parlia-
ment) extended the existing moratorium until 
at least 1 January 2016. Consequently, Ukraine 
has retained the current lease-based system for 
the development of agriculture. This will slow 
down any potential increase in investment in 
the sector, as business owners - who do not 
own the land they cultivate - are constrained by 
the investment horizon set by the term of their 
lease agreement. Under these conditions, long-
term investment increases the risk of losing the 
very basis of the business, for example due to 
problems with lease renewal, which could be 
caused by hostile competitors trying to take 
over an existing business - a phenomenon that 
has become increasingly common in Ukraine in 
recent years.
Both the government and the owners of large 
agricultural estates in Ukraine were pinning 
their hopes on the prospect of signing the EU 
agreement on a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA). Back in October of last 
year, Mykola Prysyazhnyuk, Ukraine’s Agricul-
ture Minister, argued that the liberalisation of 
trade between Ukraine and the EU would allow 
for an immediate increase in agricultural ex-
ports to the EU markets, worth the equivalent 
22 It envisages, among other things, restricting the right 
to purchase land to Ukrainian citizens only, and capping 
transactions at a maximum of 100 hectares. These pro-
posals have come under criticism from the market. The 
bill does not however contain an earlier proposal to in-
troduce limits on the maximum acreage of  leased land.
of US$0.5 billion, which was particularly im-
portant because of Ukraine’s export-orientated 
agriculture. In reality, the agreement with the 
EU would not have created better export op-
portunities for Ukraine’s agricultural products, 
but could rather have increased investment in 
agriculture locally and accelerated the mod-
ernisation of the industry and this is essential 
if Ukrainian businesses are to compete against 
foreign companies on Ukraine’s slowly growing 
domestic market. Subsequently, however, the 
Ukrainian government announced that it would 
instead pursue closer cooperation with Russia 
and Kazakhstan23 - Ukraine’s competitors in the 
global grain market.
In practice, however, Kyiv has been trying to de-
velop closer links mainly with China. In October 
2012, the State Food and Grain Corporation of 
Ukraine (SFGCU) and China National Complete 
Engineering Corporation (CCEC) signed a long-
term contract for the export of Ukrainian grain 
to China. Under the agreement, the SFGCU re-
ceived a US$1.5 billion loan from China’s Exim 
Bank (guaranteed by the Ukrainian government) 
for the purchase of grain from Ukrainian pro-
ducers. The parties agreed that in the current 
marketing year (July 2013 - June 2014) the SFG-
CU would supply up to 4 million tonnes of grain 
to China (mainly, corn and wheat; although 
the preparations for the export of soybeans 
and barley are already underway). Next year, 
Ukraine’s grain exports to China are expected 
to rise to 6 million tonnes. Granting Ukraine un-
precedented access to the Chinese market (as 
one of the very first grain exporters), as well 
as the scale of this cooperation, has translated 
into record growth in Ukraine’s grain exports in 
the current marketing year. Furthermore, due 
to the SFCGU-CNCEC deal, Ukraine will benefit 
from an increase in the import of Chinese tech-
nology and production (including, pesticides 
and fertilisers) and from potential investment. 
23 For the past few years, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
have been holding talks on the creation of a grain cartel, 
which could impact global agricultural trade.
Declining living standards and the rap-
id degradation of the countryside has 
translated into a more pronounced 
demographic crisis than in urban areas. 
Between 1991-2013, the rural popula-
tion of Ukraine decreased by as much as 
15.9% (2.7 million people).
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This, however, raises concerns about the long-
term effects of this cooperation (which could, 
for example, displace the Western technologies 
and pesticides preferred by Ukrainian agro-
holdings). Finally, it seems that the Ukrainian 
mega-farms – which are being pressured into 
participating in the SFCGU’s Chinese projects - 
would prefer to establish their own export links 
with China24.
This means that the agriculture industry is now 
forced to continue its current model of devel-
opment, in which competitiveness is deter-
mined by low production costs (including lease 
fees and wages) instead of seeing the moderni-
sation and efficiency improvements offered to 
Ukrainian agriculture by the DCFTA. Further-
more, Ukraine’s low output per hectare25 will 
24 See: http://korrespondent.net/business/economics/ 
3206361-nakormy t-k y ta i -pek yn -prev raschaet-
sia-v-krupneisheho-potrebytelia-ukraynskoho-zerna 
25 This is higher on large farms, but has remained virtually 
unchanged for 20 years at the national level, and is cur-
rently half that in Western Europe.
be compensated through economies of scale 
and extensive production; for example, of crops 
with a high rate of return, whose cultivation - 
coupled with short lease terms - will lead to 
a further degradation of soil.
The ambitions of the government and of the 
managers of large agricultural estates, com-
bined with Kyiv’s need for foreign currency, 
are putting pressure on the sector to ensure 
rapid sales growth, without regard for the re-
sulting costs (a decline in the price of exported 
produce and producers’ losses). Kyiv’s current 
priority is to make quantitative changes to the 
economy rather than qualitative, thus reinforc-
ing the current model of development, which 
concentrates production within large-scale ag-
ricultural holdings.
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APPENDIX 1
Ukraine’s agriculture in Europe and globally - selected produce
Type of produce Production volume Rank in Europe/ Globally Export volume Rank in Europe/ Globally
Corn 22.8 million tonnes Europe: 1 Globally: 7 7.8 million tonnes Europe: 1 Globally: 4
Wheat 22.3 million tonnes Europe: 4 Globally: 11 4.1 million tonnes Europe: 4 Globally: 8
Barley 9.1 million tonnes Europe: 3 Globally: 5 2.1 million tonnes Europe: 3 Globally: 5
Rye 0.6 million tonnes Europe: 4 Globally: 4
Rapeseed 1.4 million tonnes Europe: 4 Globally: 9 1.0 million tonnes Europe: 2 Globally: 4
Sunflower seeds 8.7 million tonnes Europe: 2 Globally: 2 0.4 million tonnes Europe: 3 Globally: 3
Sunflower oil Europe: 2 2.7 million tonnes Europe: 1 Globally: 1
Potatoes 24.2 million tonnes Europe: 2 Globally: 2
Sugar beets 18.7 million tonnes Europe: 4 Globally: 5
APPENDIX 2
Global price indices for food and grain between 2000-2013 (%)
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APPENDIX 3
The largest agricultural holdings in Ukraine
Name/ Abbreviation Owner/ Main shareholder Land bank
(thousands hectares)
Main business activity
1. UkrLandFarming Oleg Bakhmatyuk 670 Production and export of grains, 
meat, eggs and egg products, milk
2. Kernel Holding Andrey Verevskiy 422 Production and export of grains,
sunflower oil
3. NCH George Rohr,
Moris Tabacinic
400 Production of cereals, sunflower, soy, 
animal husbandry
4. Myronivsky
Hliboproduct
Yuriy Kosiuk 320 Breeding poultry, grains, meat 
products
5. Mriya Agro Holding Ivan Huta 298 Production of grains, sugar beets, 
potatoes
6. Ukrainian Agrarian
Investments 
Renaissance Group 261 Production and export of grains
7. Astarta Viktor Ivanchyk 245 Production of sugar, grains, milk
8. HarvEast Rinat Akhmetov
(and Vadim Novinsky)
197 Production of grains, feeds, seeds, 
dairy
9. Agroton Yuri Zhuravlev 151 Production of sunflowers, wheat, 
food, farming
10. Sintal Agriculture Mykola Tolmachev 150 Production of grains and sugar
Source: latifundist.com
